Marine transportation safety investigation M22C0231

TSB has completed this investigation. The report was published on 19 August 2024.

Table of contents

    Striking of berth
    Passenger ferry Sam McBride
    Toronto, Ontario

    The occurrence

    On 20 August 2022, at around 1700 Eastern Daylight Time, the passenger ferry Sam McBride, with 6 crew members and approximately 910 passengers on board, struck the dock while berthing at the Jack Layton Ferry Terminal in Toronto, Ontario. Twenty passengers were reported injured. Emergency services responded to the occurrence and 6 of the injured passengers were taken to hospital. The vessel and dock sustained damage. No pollution was reported.

    The Sam McBride is a double-ended ferry, meaning that it has propellers at both the forward and aft ends. The TSB’s analysis of security footage from the occurrence voyage determined that the vessel was travelling at 5 knots when it passed the first mooring dolphin on its way to the dock, while the speed of approach on other transits that day had been approximately 3 knots. The footage also showed that only the aft propeller was turning as the Sam McBride approached the dock. The aft propeller alone was not enough to stop the Sam McBride from striking the dock, given the vessel’s speed and distance from the dock.

    Post-occurrence sea trials indicated that both the forward and aft engines and their control systems were in good working order. As well, the engine control modules for the forward and aft engines did not show any fault codes or events for the day of the occurrence. The investigation was unable to determine why the forward engine and propeller did not engage to slow the vessel on the occurrence voyage.

    On the day of the occurrence, the Sam McBride had made 8 runs, 6 of which were at full capacity, and was behind its published schedule. When many people were waiting for the ferry and it was behind schedule, as in this case, crews on City of Toronto ferries expedited crossings to address passenger backlog by transiting faster and/or reducing the time it took to dock by approaching at higher speeds and slowing down at a faster rate. The City of Toronto did not have written procedures that defined a safe speed of approach during docking, which meant that decisions around docking speed were at the discretion of masters and might be influenced by operational pressure. The City of Toronto has since put in place documented procedures for docking.

    The TSB investigation into this occurrence found safety deficiencies related to passenger safety management that were also present during the TSB’s investigation of the passenger vessel Island Queen III in 2017.TSB Marine Transportation Safety Investigation M17C0179. As a result, the Board issued 3 recommendations related to passenger safety management. 

    Crew training

    The need for crew members to respond quickly and effectively to an emergency on a passenger vessel is the same for all vessels and voyages. When faced with an emergency, crew members need to have knowledge and skills related to crowd management and human behaviour in emergencies.

    While the Marine Personnel Regulations require that crew members of passenger vessels greater than 500 gross tonnage (GT) on unlimited, near coastal Class 1, or near coastal Class 2 voyages have a Specialized Passenger Safety Management certificate or endorsement, there is no such requirement for crew members of vessels on sheltered waters voyages or those on vessels of 500 GT or less. The Specialized Passenger Safety Management certificate provides training on crowd management, crisis management and human behaviour in emergencies, passenger safety, and safety for personnel providing direct services to passengers. It also provides familiarization training.

    While passenger vessels that are on sheltered waters voyages are closer to shore and shore-based emergency responders than vessels on other types of voyages, there are a number of types of emergencies that need an immediate response that cannot await the arrival of shore-based responders.

    Currently in Canada, there are only 46 passenger vessels greater than 500 GT, while there are 5025 passenger vessels of 500 GT or less.The numbers for passenger vessels were obtained from a query of the Transport Canada Vessel Registry on 17 May 2024 using the vessel type “Passengers.” Vessels may have safe manning documents to operate on different classes of voyage, so it is difficult to assign an accurate number of vessels to each class of voyage. The maximum complement of a passenger vessel depends on more factors than just its gross tonnage, which means that passenger vessels of 500 GT or less may be carrying more passengers than those greater than 500 GT. Requiring training for only vessels greater than 500 GT leaves out the majority of passenger vessels.

    The Sam McBride is less than 500 GT and was on a sheltered waters voyage. None of the crew members had received such training, nor were they required to. Following an occurrence on board the passenger vessel Island Queen III in 2017, the TSB issued a safety concern about the lack of a requirement for training in passenger safety management for crew members on all vessels carrying more than 12 passengers on sheltered water voyages. However, Transport Canada (TC) has yet to implement passenger management training requirements to fully address this concern. If all passenger vessel crew members are not trained in passenger safety management, there is a risk that they will not be prepared to manage passengers in emergency situations.

    For this reason, the Board recommends that

    the Department of Transport implement a requirement for crew members of all passenger vessels, including those on sheltered waters voyages, to complete appropriate training in passenger safety management.

    TSB Recommendation M24-01

    Passenger vessel evacuation procedures

    The Life Saving Equipment Regulations require all passenger vessels to have an evacuation procedure that dictates how all passengers and crew members will be evacuated from the vessel within 30 minutes of the abandon ship signal being given. Although this regulatory requirement is in place, TC has no formal procedure to assess if this requirement is being met. Operators who develop evacuation procedures have no approval process to confirm their procedure meets the requirement or to obtain approval from the regulator. Presently, each TC inspector or recognized organization surveyor is left to individually determine how this requirement is assessed; the requirement is most frequently assessed by the inspector or surveyor witnessing a drill on board the vessel.

    For vessels, emergency drills are an opportunity to validate the evacuation procedures; the Fire and Boat Drills Regulations require that the master of a vessel ensure that drills are carried out as if they were a real emergency, in so far as is feasible. For a passenger vessel, realistic drills require a large number of people acting as passengers, as indicated in TC’s Ship Safety Bulletin 04/2022. However, due to the logistical challenges of finding and managing a large number of volunteers, “in so far as is feasible” often means that drills are conducted without passenger involvement, which means the drill cannot evaluate the crew’s ability to evacuate passengers from the vessel.

    As is the case for many other vessels, drills on the Sam McBride were typically carried out without passengers on board, which meant that they did not provide an opportunity to realistically validate the feasibility of the vessel’s evacuation procedure. The investigation determined that the evacuation procedures for Sam McBride were not sufficient to support the evacuation of a large number of passengers, as they required crew members to be in multiple places simultaneously, assist an unreasonably large number of passengers, potentially complete multiple tasks at once, and move quickly within the vessel even if it was crowded. If passenger evacuation procedures are not validated through a realistic exercise with a representative number of participants, a vessel’s crew will be insufficiently prepared for an emergency and passengers will be at an elevated risk of injury or death.

    The issues found in the Sam McBride’s evacuation procedure are the latest example pointing to a need for TC to validate passenger vessels’ evacuation procedures. In 2020, following the occurrence on board the passenger vessel Island Queen III, the Board issued a safety concern regarding the risk to passengers if evacuation procedures are not validatedMore than 4 years later, the safety deficiency still exists and the risk to passengers remains high. Therefore, the Board recommends that

    the Department of Transport implement a formal validation and approval process for passenger vessel evacuation procedures.

    TSB Recommendation M24-02

    Passenger counting

    In any emergency, it is essential to have an accurate count of passengers. Without an accurate count, a crew and emergency responders will be unable to determine if all passengers have been accounted for. To this end, the Fire and Boat Drills Regulations require that, before a passenger vessel sails, the master be provided with the number of persons on board and with details of persons who have declared a need for special care or assistance during an emergency. On voyages of 12 hours or more, there is also a requirement to keep a separate count of the number of children and infants; however, there is no such requirement for voyages of less than 12 hours.

    When passengers were boarding the Sam McBride or other Toronto Island Park ferries, the number of passengers was estimated (counted in groups of 5 to 10) by a member of the crew and tracked using a hand-held tally counter. However, this method did not give the exact number of passengers boarding and meant that, in the event of an emergency, it would not be possible to account for all passengers. As well, the Toronto Island Park ferries did not keep a separate count of children and infants on board, nor were they required to. However, this meant that there was no way to determine whether there was an adequate number of lifejackets available in the appropriate sizes for the passengers on board.

    Although TSB Recommendation M08-01 addressing passenger counting procedures on board ferries was closed as Fully Satisfactory in July 2010, 4 subsequent investigationsTSB marine transportation safety investigations M22A0312, M17C0179, M15A0009, and M13L0067. have shown that the provisions in the Fire and Boat Drills Regulations requiring an accurate count of passengers are not being consistently met. If there is no accurate method to count the passengers boarding a vessel, there is a risk that not all passengers will be accounted for in an emergency. Furthermore, if there is no method to identify passengers that require special care or additional assistance during an emergency and there are no provisions in place to provide this additional assistance, the safety of these passengers may be compromised.

    Therefore, the Board recommends that

    the Department of Transport implement a process to validate that passenger vessels are keeping an accurate count of all passengers, including a separate count of the number of children and infants, on all voyages.

    TSB Recommendation M24-03


    Investigation information

    Map showing the location of the occurrence

    M22C0231

    Striking of berth
    Passenger ferry Sam McBride
    Toronto, Ontario

    Investigator-in-charge

    Etienne Seguin-Bertrand joined the TSB in 2022 as a Senior Investigator. Mr. Séguin-Bertrand began his seagoing career in 2007 as a deck officer on Canadian flagged bulk carriers. Prior to joining the TSB, he gained considerable experience in the management of commercial shipping and port operations in Canada, especially in the Great Lakes and Canadian Arctic. Mr. Séguin-Bertrand holds a Chief Mate certificate of competency issued by Transport Canada, as well as a Bachelor of Maritime Studies and a Master of Maritime Management from Memorial University of Newfoundland.


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    Class of investigation

    This is a class 2 investigation. These investigations are complex and involve several safety issues requiring in-depth analysis. Class 2 investigations, which frequently result in recommendations, are generally completed within 600 days. For more information, see the Policy on Occurrence Classification.

    TSB investigation process

    There are 3 phases to a TSB investigation

    1. Field phase: a team of investigators examines the occurrence site and wreckage, interviews witnesses and collects pertinent information.
    2. Examination and analysis phase: the TSB reviews pertinent records, tests components of the wreckage in the lab, determines the sequence of events and identifies safety deficiencies. When safety deficiencies are suspected or confirmed, the TSB advises the appropriate authority without waiting until publication of the final report.
    3. Report phase: a confidential draft report is approved by the Board and sent to persons and corporations who are directly concerned by the report. They then have the opportunity to dispute or correct information they believe to be incorrect. The Board considers all representations before approving the final report, which is subsequently released to the public.

    For more information, see our Investigation process page.

    The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline, and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.