Rail transportation safety recommendation R00-03

Transport Canada (TC) accepted the recommendation. TC continued to work with the Railway Association of Canada (RAC) to ensure that the requirements of the CROR provide the highest level of safety and clarity for the railway industry. In this regard, TC ensured that of the Board's recommendation was brought to the attention of RAC's membership. In addition, TC corresponded with the RAC and requested a review of the wording of CROR Rule 85.

Rule 85 on Reporting Delays states “The conductor of each train will ensure that the RTC is promptly advised of any known condition which may delay the train.” TC indicated that they interpret the word “promptly” as being the immediate notification of any train delay.

TC informed the TSB that they have continued to work with the Railway Association of Canada (RAC), ensuring that the RAC and its membership are aware of the Board's recommendation concerning suitability of current rules and railway instructions prescribing the prompt reporting of operating delays to all concerned when there is a safety risk. TC corresponded with the RAC, requesting a review of the wording of current rules and the current understanding to the requirements for reporting delays. TC's interpretation of the rules demands immediate notification of any train delay.

However, TSB was not aware of any safety action taken in the railway industry as a result of the expression of TC's position, and therefore the response to R00-03 was assessed as having Satisfactory Intent.

TC requested a revision of CROR Rule 85 by the Rules Revision Team of the Railway Association of Canada (RAC). However, the Rules Revision Team was not receptive to changing this rule without further discussions. The RAC maintained that Rule 85 was not a rule that provided for the spacing or closing up of trains. However, the team was looking at writing a new book of rules and would consider changing the wording of Rule 85. In addition, it was noted that as this rule is an administration rule rather than an operational rule, it may be removed and included in an administration section of CROR. TC considered this recommendation open and kept TSB informed on further developments.

In December 2003, TC provided a further update indicating that several discussions had taken place between TC and the Railway Association of Canada (RAC) to review the wording of CROR Rule 85.

TC in conjunction with the RAC, assessed the suitability of CROR Rule 85 and other railway instructions concerning the immediate reporting of operation delays to all concerned when there is a safety risk. It was determined that CROR Rule 85 is not to be used to report delays in the spacing of trains, but rather it is to be used to advise the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) that train speed cannot be maintained and that the train will be delayed.

TC also noted that this incident relates to a restricting signal as per Rule 426 of CROR which is a Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) signal indicating that a train can proceed at restricted speed. RESTRICTED SPEED is defined in CROR as a speed that will permit stopping within one-half the range of vision of equipment. This definition also requires that employees must be prepared to stop short of a switch not properly lined and in no case exceed SLOW SPEED. NOTE: When moving at restricted speed, be on the lookout for broken rails. Also, SLOW SPEED is defined in CROR as a SPEED not exceeding fifteen miles per hour.

The TSB investigation report indicates that the crew was not complying totally with Rule 426 of CROR since it collided with the rear of Train 771. (i.e., it was not operating at a speed that would permit stopping within one-half the range of vision of equipment). TC notified the RAC concerning this update in order that RAC could further advise their membership of this accident and bring to their attention the importance of complying with railway operating rules. TC considered this recommendation closed.

TC indicated that they had corresponded with the RAC, requesting a review of the wording of current understanding of the requirements for reporting delays. TC advised the RAC that their interpretation of the rules demanded immediate notification of any train delay. However, after meeting with industry it appears that TC was dissuaded. While industry rule makers concluded that an amendment to the existing rule was not practicable, no other solutions were proposed by TC to resolve this deficiency.

In consideration that this deficiency remained outstanding and that TC considered the matter closed, the response to Recommendation R00-03 was reassessed as Unsatisfactory.

TC indicated that this recommendation had been changed to “open”. However, TC did not have any further updates at this time.

As no updates were provided, TSB's assessment of the response to Recommendation R00-03 remains as Unsatisfactory.

There is a disagreement between the RAC and TC on the interpretation of CROR Rules 84 and 85. TC will be meeting with the RAC in the near future to discuss issues related to CROR Rules 84 and 85. Discussion points will include the need to broadcast train delays, locations, conditions, etc., to help address the issues of crew fatigue and situational awareness.

TC has indicated acceptance of the deficiency and that a meeting will be scheduled with the RAC to discuss these issues. However, as a secondary method of collision avoidance, (e.g. administrative such as radio notification) has yet to be considered, the Board reassesses the response to Recommendation R00-03 to remain as having Satisfactory Intent. The Board remains concerned about the time taken to debate the existing rules rather than addressing the safety deficiency.

TC contends that there may be times when unconfirmed information provided by train crews pertaining to train locations may or may not be beneficial. However, this occurrence substantiates TC and the railway's position because when the crew heard the scanner's message they misinterpreted the unconfirmed information to believe that Train 771 had left that location and therefore disregarded the requirements of travelling at restricted speed. TC also believes that CTC rules, when properly complied with, are safer than OCS types of control, as it removes part of the human element, thus reducing the chance of mistakes caused by human error. The use of unconfirmed information to control train movements negates the effectiveness of the signal system and is a violation of Rule 126 of the CROR that is in specifically in place to prevent these situations from happening. The CTC system drastically reduces the number of human interactions that reduces the number of errors and, if it were increased, would only contribute to additional system errors that everyone is striving to reduce.

TC has reviewed its response to the TSB recommendation and all subsequent updates provided to the TSB since 2000, and assessed with the railways suitability of current Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) and railway instructions concerning the immediate reporting of operating delays to all concerned when there is a safety risk and any possible safety deficiencies. TC has come to a determination that current CROR are adequate, that no safety deficiency exist and that any suggested modification to current operating rules or any other methods of collision avoidance, such as radio notification, may compromise the safety of the existing railway operating system rather than improvement. Human factors issues and positive train control are being looked at by industry.”

TC has reviewed the deficiency with the RAC, but has decided not to seek any changes to rules or instructions. TC has made an assessment of the suitability of current Canadian Rail Operating Rules and railway instructions concerning the immediate reporting of operation delays to all concerned when there is a safety risk and determined that the current rules are adequate. In consideration that TC has performed the assessment as recommended, but the safety deficiency remains unaddressed, the Board reassesses the response to Recommendation R00-03 as being Unsatisfactory.