News release

Today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its investigation report (R24C0020) into a 2024 accident where a train collided with a second stationary train near Greely, British Columbia (BC).

On February 16, 2024, Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPKC) train 805 was travelling on the north main track of the Mountain Subdivision when it collided with the trailing car of CPKC train 301 that was waiting on the same track. As a result of the collision, four head-end locomotives of train 805 derailed, with one catching fire, and leaking approximately 17,500 litres of diesel fuel. Four cars from train 301 derailed, with one catching fire, and spilled about 400 tons of grain. Both crew members on train 805 sustained injuries.

The investigation found that train 805 missed a Clear to Stop indication—meaning it had to be prepared to stop at the next signal—due to the crew receiving a call from the rail traffic controller which diverted their focus away from the signal. Therefore, the crew mistakenly believed they were operating on a Clear indication and were ultimately unprepared to stop. Train 805 ended up passing the next signal. When the flashing light at the tail end of stationary train 301 came into view, the locomotive engineer on train 805 made an emergency brake application; however, there was not enough distance to avoid the collision.

Shortly following this occurrence, the TSB sent a rail safety advisory letter to Transport Canada (TC) drawing their attention to this collision and three others where trains operated under restricting signal indications. This was followed by a second rail safety advisory letter to CPKC informing the company that, in the absence of backup physical defences to prevent collisions, it may wish to review its procedures for avoiding distraction in critical operating situations. Both these safety advisory letters highlight the continuing absence of physical fail-safe train controls and the absence of effective interim measures to help ensure the success of administrative defences for trains operating under restricting signals.

Following railway signal indications has been on the TSB Watchlist since 2012. The TSB has made three recommendations (R00-04, R13-01, R22-04) on this safety issue. Since 2013, TC and the railway industry have been discussing the framework needed to address the issue, yet the work is not sufficiently advanced to indicate when additional physical safety defences will be implemented.

See the investigation page for more information.